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Interpreting Fictionality and Ontological Blurrings in and Between 




In there’s no place like time, the exhibition catalogue accompanying the retrospective of twentieth 
century video artist Alana Olsen, R. M. Berry reflects on Olsen’s (1987) film Scarred: “ . . . the 
world continuously writes upon us, reminds us where we’ve been, that that place is real” (Olsen 
there’s no place like time, no pagination).1 Alana Olsen’s film—Berry suggests—contemplates how 
we experience reality by exploring the stories that people tell about, and that are symbolized by, the 
scars on their body. In turn, lived embodied experiences inform how people narrate real-world 
events and how they create imagined worlds.2 This article explores the aesthetic texture of imagined 
worlds and their ontological relationships with felt reality. 
Ontological instability is well known as the dominant topos of postmodernist fiction, 
frequently generated by metaleptic transgressions staged across recursive, semi-permeable world-
structures; the effect is the artifice of the work being foregrounded and the supposed real becoming 
exactly that, supposed, exposed as another ontological level of construction (McHale; Ryan). 
However, contemporary fiction exhibits a renewed interest in connecting with the real; a propensity 
that Ameel and Caracciolo—in their introduction to this special issue—identify as “earnest 
ontologies.” Such earnestness towards the real world, and our human place within it, resonates with 
Berry’s description of Alana Olsen’s film Scarred: motivated by the visceral imprint of a scar, 
“everyone tells some version of the same story: I’m here. This is the proof against the feeling I 
sometimes have that I am nowhere” (there’s no place like time; original emphasis). In this article, I 
show how—in contemporary fiction—ontological distortions and metaleptic transgressions can 
work, not to override reality but rather, to reinvigorate our human sense of lived experience and 
reaffirm the place of narratives within it.3 
My case study is what might be considered a triptych of interrelated texts, all penned by 
Lance Olsen: Theories of Forgetting (2014), there’s no place like time (2016), and [[there]] (2014). 
Whilst these texts feature overlapping content, they appear dissimilar in their generic and 
ontological foundations, published as novel, exhibition catalogue, and journal, respectively. I use 
‘appear’ deliberately because Theories of Forgetting and there’s no place like time are actually both 
fictional and examples of what I have previously called “ontological hoax”: works that 
“masquerade as something they are not, disguising their fictional status” (“Multimodal Literature” 
432). There is, therefore, a paradox at play in this article’s opening discussion: the artist Alana 
Olsen, whose career is charted in there's no place like time (and who features in Theories of 
Forgetting), is a fictional construct; R. M. Berry is a real person, but his words quoted above are 
entirely fictionalized (invented by Lance Olsen). Speaking back to Berry, then, fiction sometimes 
does not remind us which places, which people, or which worlds are real and which are not. Instead 
of reducing the real to a fictional construct though, the ontological blurrings of Olsen’s fiction serve 
to enhance readers’ phenomenological and emotional experiences in relation both to narrative and 
felt reality. 
My methodology—introduced in the next section—utilizes Text World Theory and the 
metalanguage of the narrative interrelation framework to explore issues of ontology, fictionality, 
and narrative experience. The ensuing analysis demonstrates the dexterity of this cognitive 
approach to fictionality, including its agility in capturing readers’ experiences of ontological 
distortion. Focusing primarily on Theories of Forgetting, my analysis considers the effects and 
affects of metaleptic ontological ruptures, caused by textual references to the author, visual 
depiction of the author, and the installation of the fictional narrative in a real-world setting as an art 
exhibition. 
 
Fictionality, Ontology, and Cognition 
The concept of fictionality designates a property of discourse which entails imaginary events and/or 
persons (cf. Cohn). An influential, prevailing approach to the study of fictionality takes the form of 
a rhetorical account, primarily associated with scholarship by James Phelan, Henrik Skov Nielsen, 
and Richard Walsh. Phelan defines fictionality as “any rhetorical act in which somebody on some 
occasion intentionally signals his or her use of a discursive invention to someone else for some 
purpose(s)” (“Fictionality” 235); a definition that construes narrative as a communicative act 
between discourse producer(s) and receiver(s). Intentionality and interpretation are therefore crucial 
issues, as demonstrated by the fifth thesis in Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh’s “Ten Theses about 
Fictionality”: “fictionality is an interpretive assumption about a sender’s communicative act” (66). 
If this is the case—and as I have argued elsewhere (“Using Life”; “‘dissolving margins’”; 
“‘Why’”)—cognitively informed frameworks are best placed to identify readers’ interpretations 
concerning fictionality, including the ontological status of the work and the protagonists therein. 
Although the rhetorical approach gestures towards acts of cognition and interpretation, it 
nevertheless considers the activities of reading and interpretive reception theoretically (the 
difference between rhetorical and cognitive approaches is discussed by Phelan, “Cognitive 
Narratology”). I adopt a cognitive approach to literary fictionality and ontology principally using 
Text World Theory which, developed based on insights from cognitive science, enables a rigorous, 
empirically grounded account of reader experience.4 
Text World Theory explicates the way mental representations are generated during discourse 
processing and the experiential texture of those representations. An underpinning distinction is 
made between the discourse-world and text-worlds. The discourse-world designates the 
communicative context, modelled by and including participants, such as the real author and real 
readers. Paul Werth emphasizes that because it is “founded on interpretation, and is ‘filled in’ and 
edited, the discourse-world is a construct although one that we may suppose is founded on ‘real’ 
external circumstances” (17; my emphasis). Interestingly, scientific theories such as “conscious 
realism” (Hoffman; Hoffman and Prakash), “veiled nonlocality” (Kak, Chopra, and Kafatos), and 
“Qualia science” (Chopra and Kafatos) make similar claims about reality itself: that the objective 
world is structured by and experienced as reality through active perception and consciousness.5 
Text-worlds are imagined representations constructed during discourse processing. The 
protagonists in text-worlds are enactors, a term that allows for the same character to exist in 
multiple but ontologically distinct versions (e.g., past-selves) as well as to be either invented or to 
represent a real individual. Thus, the text-worlds of an autobiography would include an imagined 
enactor representing the real author. Whilst text-worlds can be produced by various communicative 
modes (Gibbons, Multimodality), the framework prioritizes linguistic cues. Werth—who originally 
proposed Text World Theory—describes a text-world as “a deictic space, defined initially by the 
discourse itself, and specifically by the deictic and referential elements in it” (51). At the micro-
level of lexico-grammatical analysis, text-worlds are constructed from deictic expressions (time, 
space/location, protagonists and objects). Changes in deictic world-building information cause 
world-switches, as do ontological fluctuations, for instance prompted by modality, hypotheticality, 
or shifts in perceptual deictic viewpoint. With regards to the latter, if different characters were to 
describe the same narrative event, each account would necessarily produce a text-world structure 
separate from the other(s): minds (whether fictional or otherwise)—including the perspectives, 
thoughts, and experiences they entail—are ontologically and cognitively distinct. 
In my work, I employ the concept of text-worlds in this sense as well as extrapolate it to 
capture a reader’s impression of the various ontological layers within a single narrative text or 
across a chain of related narratives or texts. After all, boundaries are also drawn between different 
narrative levels since these are, necessarily, different layers or planes in text-world architecture. It is 
nevertheless worth clarifying that text-worlds differ from the related (perhaps more well known, in 
narratology at least) concept of storyworlds which David Herman defines as “mental models of who 
did what to and with whom, when, where, why, and in what fashion in the world to which recipients 
relocate” (5). In a cognitively driven worlds-approach, then, we can distinguish between three 
levels of analysis: the storyworld as a mental model that encapsulates the sum of the textual 
universe’s locations, events, and characters; macro-level text-worlds as models of ontologically 
distinct narrative levels; and micro-level text-worlds generated by and derived from the 
particularities of textual composition.6 Storyworlds and text-worlds (both macro- and micro-level) 
are mental representations; the difference is the degree of ontological granularity and scale. Text 
World Theory is necessarily founded on, and finely attuned to, “essential differences” in ontology 
(Gavins, Text World Theory 76). Consequently, the distinctions I suggest here enhance the 
framework’s explanatory power with regards to fictionality, ontological instability, and 
experientiality as well as allow (and, indeed, generate) a more fine-grained narratological account 
of the ontological architecture within the totality of a work’s storyworld.7 
Although both text-worlds and the discourse-world are cognitive constructs, the distinction is 
vital for capturing participants’ felt ontological differentiation between these separate realms of 
experience. Similarly, participants’ affective engagements with fictional versus non-fictional text-
worlds is, in part, determined by the ontological conditions attributed to these worlds. As Werth 
states, reality relations “are stipulated rather than built in” (17). Assessments of fictionality are 
therefore made by participants in the discourse-world. A participant’s appraisal, according to 
Werth, “consists of calculating the truth or probability of the propositions in the text . . . together 
with background knowledge” and “modifying that calculation in terms of the reliability and claims 
of the speaker” (210). This is not altogether at odds with the rhetorical account, in which fictionality 
is seen as a “contextual assumption” (Walsh 30). The focus differs, though, because in a cognitive 
approach—whilst intentionality and textual cues are important—fictionality and ontology are 
deemed attributes that are cognitively assigned to text-worlds; this reception-oriented emphasis 
explains both misinterpretations of fictionality and the experience of ontological distortions (see 
Gibbons “‘dissolving margins’”; “‘Why’”). 
Whilst real, flesh-and-blood authors are discourse-world participants, readers’ capture authors 
and authorial intentionality through cognitive processes of mind-modelling (see Stockwell, “The 
Texture” 153; Mason 96–98; Gibbons, “‘dissolving margins’”; “Using Life”). Moreover, authors 
sometimes appear as characters in their fictions and, thus, as enactors in imagined text-worlds. 
Enactor-authors can be introduced in a variety of more-or-less explicit ways; in this article, I 
borrow and adapt the metalanguage of Jessica Mason’s narrative interrelation framework in order to 
describe the degree of ontological instability posed by the presence of enactor-authors. Designed to 
track the linguistic mechanics by which intertextual interrelations between narratives transpire, 
Mason’s framework involves two classificatory axes: the specific/generic axis discerns whether one 
narrative in particular is being referenced (specific) or a more general category (generic); the 
marked/unmarked axis captures how explicitly the intertext is signalled. If we relate these terms to 
enactor-authors in reading, references to any individual author will necessarily be specific: a 
specific marked reference, then, indicates that a full name overtly signals the enactor-author 
interrelation; a specific unmarked reference indicates that, in place of an explicit name, the enactor-
author interrelation is made implicitly, such as when readers notice that a character’s biographical 
details match those of an author. The more specific and marked the author-character interrelation, 
the more apparent the metaleptic breach, and the more forceful the referential pull, for readers. This 
quintessentially postmodernist device—authors appearing in their fictions—necessarily produces 
ontological blurrings (McHale 29–30, 197–215) but—as my analysis argues—this does not 
inevitably reduce such markers of the real—e.g., the author figure—to fictional constructs. 
Werth highlights that meaningful communication is a “joint effort on the part of its producer 
and its recipients to build up a ‘world’” (20) but that because “there is no other secret channel of 
meaning between the speaker and the hearer or, a fortiori, between the writer and the reader, than 
the discourse itself, the retrieval and selection of knowledge relevant to a given discourse must be 
text-driven” (149). Accordingly, the creation of text-worlds is text-driven, but assigning ontological 
status is context-dependent. As the fictional ventriloquism of this article’s opening demonstrates, 
there are no absolute “signposts” of fictionality (Cohn); rather—as Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh 
argue—it “takes an interaction among authors, readers, and textual features in a historical context to 
establish something as a signpost” (“Fictionality” 106). In other words, readers’ appraisals of 
ontology and fictionality arise from a contextual triangulation of intentionality, textuality, and 
interpretation. Accessing and evidencing such knowledge can pose challenges for analysis. 
Consequently, my analysis begins by considering contextual factors in a literary experience, namely 
potential paratextual signposts. 
 
Reading Authors 
All readers bring pre-existing knowledge structures to reading experiences, including information 
and expectations about the author and the book. Gérard Genette has described book covers as “the 
first manifestation of the book offered to the reader’s perception” (27), making it a sensible place to 
start in analyzing literary fictionality. Theories of Forgetting is rather unusual: the cover is designed 
with each side showing an identical back cover; on opening each side of the book, the reader finds 
duplicated titles, copyright pages, dedications. Resultantly, paratextual information is prioritized 
over the imagistic content usually dominant on front covers. The dual covers of Theories of 
Forgetting feature: price, genre indicator, synopsis, promotional endorsement, photo and bio 
statement of the author, photograph attribution, publisher information, cover design attribution, and 
bar code. Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh highlight the role of paratextual indices in signaling 
fictionality, though they concede “such cues may be ambiguous and not all-decisive” (“Ten Theses” 
67). Theories of Forgetting’s genre designation is given on the cover as “Literature/Fiction.” 
Studies in experimental psychology offer evidence that paratextual markers of fictionality 
influence how readers engage with texts: whilst both fiction and non-fiction elicit mental 
representations, these representations are not equivalent.8 As Altmann et al. outline, “reading facts 
seems to elicit mental simulation processes basically regarding actions and their outcomes, reading 
fiction appears to initiate simulation processes especially concerning the motives behind an action 
and thereby the protagonist’s mind” (27). For fiction, readers create more detailed text-worlds 
(Zwaan), including the extent to which they engage in “social and moral reasoning” (Altmann et al. 
27). Over the course of Theories of Forgetting, one of the central characters—Alana Olsen—
becomes terminally ill and her husband struggles with grief. Moreover, this intensely human 
narrative is set against a larger backdrop of planetary global warming (for a discussion of these 
issues in the novel, see Gibbons, “Entropology”).9 Paradoxically, then, it is fictionality itself that 
encourages readers to emotionally engage with the novel’s characters and depictions of climate 
change and therefore—contra an uncritical postmodernist celebration of unreality (McHale 219)—
to examine the social and moral dimensions of the real-world circumstances which underwrite the 
narrative. 
With paratextual indicators of the novel’s fictionality, Theories of Forgetting exhibits a weak 
commitment to its ontological hoax. Nevertheless, the conceit is that, rather than a novel, it is a 
multimodal collection of documents. Experimental filmmaker Alana’s first-person diary begins at 
one side of the book, presented in black Adobe Garamond Pro typeface, and including various 
images supposedly inserted by Alana relating to her life and current film project. On the other side 
of the book, in grey American Typewriter font and on the same pages as Alana’s diary but with the 
text turned 180 degrees, is the third-person travelogue of Alana’s husband Hugh who, overwhelmed 
by the passing of his wife, is haunted by his memories of their life together and her final days. 
Lastly, their daughter Aila’s marginalia, in blue Georges typeface which resembles handwriting, is 
seemingly transposed over her parents’ narratives.10 Whilst all of these narratives belong to the 
same storyworld, the multimodal presentation of the book creates a layered macro-level text-world 
structure: whilst the page presents all three narrative layers simultaneously, these texts-worlds are 
ontologically separate (they are distinct in time/space and have different perceptual ontologies as 
the subjective narration of each enactor). Nevertheless, readers make “intratextual references” 
between them; that is, “connections between multiple narratives within a single text” (Mason 167). 
Crucially, the accumulative text-world structure generates felt degrees of ontological and 
phenomenological distance from a reader’s discourse-world: Alana’s narrative seems furthest from 
the reader whilst Aila’s—containing frequent metatextual references to and about her writing, thus 
foregrounding the page-surface of the book—seems closest to the reader’s discourse-world.11 
Aila’s correspondence echoes out to her brother, addressed only once by name as “Lance” 
(H.111).12 In his explication of the “pacts” between autobiographer or novelist and their readers, 
Philippe Lejeune argues that conflating the author and protagonist in name “excludes the possibility 
of fiction” (17). He therefore identifies two kinds of “autobiographical pact.” The first is 
autobiography proper: this is explicitly marked as such so—according to the metalanguage of 
narrative interrelation—this would feature a specific marked enactor-author. The second is a zero 
case: readers’ deduce that the identity of a mentioned character is the same as the author based on 
textual details or references such as part of a name.13 If a name is absent, this is a specific unmarked 
enactor-author but, if part of a name is used to prompt the interrelation, I suggest we consider this to 
be a specific partially-marked enactor-author.14 Correspondingly, it is partially-marked reference 
that encourages readers of Theories of Forgetting to interpret the textually addressed “Lance” in 
relation to author Lance Olsen, whose name appears on the book’s cover(s). However, the novel’s 
paratextual “fiction” label means that Theories of Forgetting cannot be read as an instance of zero-
case autobiography. 
Later in the same essay, Lejeune questions: “Can the hero of a novel declared as such have 
the same name as the author? Nothing would prevent such a thing from existing and it is perhaps an 
internal contradiction from which some interesting effects could be drawn” (18). Lejeune’s 
comment has been credited with inspiring autofiction, a literary genre blurring autobiography and 
fiction. In most critical accounts of autofiction—including my own mapping of its stylistic features 
(Gibbons, “Autonarration”)—an onomastic correspondence between author and protagonist is 
pivotal. Even though the genre indicator of Theories of Forgetting marks it as neither autobiography 
nor autofiction, the specific partially-marked reference to “Lance” motivates what Lejeune 
eventually calls the “phantasmatic pact,” an “indirect form of the autobiographical pact” containing 
“phantasms of the individual” (27; original emphasis). Identifying “Lance” as a specific partially-
marked enactor-author reference captures the fact that whilst it gestures towards Lance Olsen, the 
elision of his surname—like an unmarked reference—also “problematises the consistent 
identification” (Mason 79). For this reason and in the context of the paratextually signaled 
fictionality of Theories of Forgetting, readers are unlikely to indiscriminately conflate “Lance” with 
Lance Olsen. The interrelation is strongly encouraged though, not least because on the inside cover 
pages, Lance Olsen is listed not as author but as “Lance Olsen, editor” (A5.; H.3) and the 
acknowledgements maintain “The editor wishes to thank. . .” (A.9.; H.7). 
In Text World terms, whilst stemming from the proximally textured macro-level text-world in 
which Aila writes to her brother, “Lance” also activates another text-world in which readers assign 
an enactor of the author Lance Olsen (in other words, Lejeune’s phantasm). This text-world is 
sparse, but enables readers to create a trans-world mapping between the fictionalized enactor 
“Lance” and their mind-model of the authorial writer. Moreover, because of Lance Olsen’s 
supposed editorship, this text-world sits atop the chain of text-world ontologies (shown in Figure 1) 
and is akin to what Joanna Gavins has called a “composition text-world” (Reading the Absurd 115) 
in which an enactor of the author and his writing, in this case editing, is conceptualized. According 
to McHale, when—in postmodernist texts—the author metaleptically appears in the fictional world 
as “a visible maker, its [the fictional world’s] own status must inevitably change, too; it has become 
less the mirror of nature, more an artifact, visibly a made thing” (30; original emphasis). This is 
only partially true for Theories of Forgetting because, whilst the composition text-world forms 
another ontological level which foregrounds the storyworld’s recursive construction, this is in 
keeping with the ontological hoax of the novel as an edited manuscript. Text World analysis thus 
accounts for the experiential effects of Theories of Forgetting’s ontological hoax, whereby readers 
develop a felt sense of the fiction’s relationship to and grounding in reality.15 The trans-world 
mapping between the fictionalized enactor of “Lance” as editor and the reader’s mind-model of the 
discourse-world author endorses Theories of Forgetting as a documentary artefact, evidentially 
existent in the reader’s discourse-world. 
 
Figure 1: Macro-structure of text-world ontologies in Theories of Forgetting 
 
Seeing Authors 
Authorial intrusions can be more or less disruptive in terms of their impact on the ontological 
boundary between fiction and reality. Furthermore, the fictional or referential effects of enactor-
authors is not equal across semiotic modes. Linda Haverty Rugg has argued that photographs seem 
to offer “physical evidence” and, as such, “re-anchor the subject to the physical world, insist on the 
verifiable presence of an embodied and solid individual” (2). Photos in Theories of Forgetting 
function at the intradiegetic level of Alana’s diary. The majority relate to her current film project or 
her health concerns. One particular photo in Theories of Forgetting stands out (A.285; see Figure 
2), not least because it is discussed in both Alana’s and Hugh’s narratives. The photo undoubtedly 
depicts real people and belongs to the genre of holiday or travel photography (it is not overly 
aestheticized and does not appear to have been professionally taken). It cues readers to build the 
depicted text-world—a man and a woman stand in front of a temple, presumably somewhere in 
Asia—which is assigned a referential status: the photographed event really happened. Actually, the 
photo produces a specific unmarked reference because it shows real author Lance Olsen and his 
wife Andi Olsen but without explicit indication. Since a bio photo of the author is included (twice) 
on Theories of Forgetting’s cover(s), readers should detect the correspondence with the man in this 
photo. For readers who do notice, their referential text-world for the photo will include an enactor 
of Lance Olsen (and Andi Olsen). 
 
Figure 2: Theories of Forgetting (A.285) 
 
Alana’s narrative account of the photo is given overleaf. She writes: “Let’s say this is H., this 
is A., somewhere inside Angkor Wat. The Ta Prohm Temple, let’s say, although it could be 
somewhere else” (A.286). Alana’s account is already ontologically complex because of the way its 
hypothetical and epistemic modality questions the reality of her representation (generating a 
number of micro-level text-worlds). Moreover, the use of initials “A.” and “H.” as metonymic 
identities standing for Alana and Hugh delivers a third-person description that splits Alana’s 
narrating self from the depicted self. Hugh’s narrative also potentially alludes to this photograph 
(H.350): 
 
Ready? Says the tourist they stopped and asked to snap their picture, a skinny pockmarked 
German in black leather pants and black t-shirt. 
The couple processes a pair of traveler smiles. 
 
This is a narrative fragment with no preceding contextualization and is located at the opposing side 
of the book to the photo and Alana’s account. Consequently, some readers might not connect “the 
couple” in Hugh’s narrative to the photo; others will though, particularly because Hugh’s narrative 
often revisits episodes from Alana’s. The connection is certainly encouraged since, on the facing 
page to Hugh’s description, Aila’s marginalia reads “Yes lets,” an affirmation that appears to 
respond to Alana’s hypothetical suggestions. 
Text comprehension tasks have shown that readers detect discrepancies in ontological 
conditions (e.g., when a sentence depicts a real person meeting a fictional character). Yang and Xue 
suggest that this is because participants build a mental representation with a particular ontological 
status and then struggle to assimilate the ontological deviation: “Participants felt difficulty when 
they had to add a real human character into an unrealistic event, or add an unreal character that does 
not exist into a realistic event that can possibly happen in the real world” (“Distinguishing” 49). For 
this photo in Theories of Forgetting, two interpretations arise: it is a picture of the real Lance Olsen 
and Andi Olsen; it depicts the fictional characters Hugh and Alana. The latter, however, has been 
narrativized by both Alana and Hugh and therefore readers conceptualize two different macro-level 
text-worlds, representing each account and textually encoded point of view. There are therefore 
three macro-level text-world construals related to the photograph and these are not easily 
reconciled. This ontological instability is even harder to resolve for readers who recognize the 
location, in front of which real author Lance and wife Andi Olsen stand, as the Ta Prohm temple in 
Cambodia which matches Alana’s hypothetical description in the fiction. 
The photo therefore creates what Haverty Rugg in her discussion of autobiographical photos 
calls “double consciousness” (2), what Lejeune describes for the phantasmatic pact as a “[double] 
blow, or rather double vision—double writing” (27), and what Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh refer to 
as fictionality’s “double exposure” in which “[fictive] communication may invite the reader or 
listener to map an engagement with representations of what is not onto what is” (“Ten Theses” 68; 
original emphasis). Because of the already doubled intratextuality (the single event described twice, 
in two characters’ narratives), Theories of Forgetting evokes not only doubled but tripled 
imaginative construals. Accordingly (as shown in Figure 3), readers create macro-level text-world 
representations of the photo’s referential origins and of both Alana’s and Hugh’s narratives. 
Because the photo was not explicitly mentioned in the text, connections between the photograph 
and narrative accounts are formed through specific unmarked intratextual mappings whilst 
correspondences between the figures in the photo and Alana and Hugh as fictional enactors occur as 
trans-world identity mappings. Furthermore, trans-world mappings between enactors in different 
text-worlds create ruptures in the ontological boundaries between them. Consequently, in order to 
process the ontological distortion stimulated by the photograph and its narrative engagements, 
readers must generate what Gavins identifies as a “blended-world” which is the “result of a 




Figure 3: Macro structure of text-world ontologies in Theories of Forgetting, resulting from photo and narrative 
interrelations 
 
Text World analysis not only reveals the cognitive architecture entailed in ontological clashes 
and blurs; it also elucidates fictive discourse’s experiential resonance for readers in the discourse-
world. Rather than resulting in fictional/referential indeterminacy or foregrounding the ontological 
construction of the fiction and its layers, as postmodernist texts purportedly do, this ontological 
blurring creates multiple “exposures” and these can continue to interact with each other after the 
moment of blending (or doubling), resulting in an experiential and affective resonance (cf. Alice 
Bell’s discussion of ontological resonance in her article in this special issue). For instance, take the 
dual dedications to Theories of Forgetting (on both sides of the book), which read: “for A, and all 
the days left” (A.7; H.5). Since, as Genette highlights, typically “the dedicator is always the author” 
(130), on first encounter readers interpret the dedication by reference to their mind-model of Lance 
Olsen; thus, if readers have knowledge about Olsen’s life, “A” in the dedication is a partially-
marked reference to Olsen’s wife Andi. Adding strength to this claim, in [[there]], Olsen writes 
(104): 
 
Because my books would never have been themselves, in other words, without Andi most 
of all, her artist’s eye, her ability to teach me daily how to unlearn certain ways of seeing. 
Every sentence in every single one is dedicated to her. 
 
Readers can create multiple text-world referents for the “A” in Theories of Forgetting’s 
dedication(s), not least because the same initial was used in Alana’s description of the intradiegetic 
photo discussed above (“this is A.”) and readers will possess this knowledge the second time they 
encounter the dedication. In relation to the fictive text-world(s) of Theories of Forgetting, then, “A” 
can also function as a dedication from “Lance” as editor to either his sister Aila or to their deceased 
mother Alana. The latter interpretation is an effect of readers’ intratextual mappings and prior 
experience of the photograph’s blended-world formation. As mentioned, over the course of 
Theories of Forgetting, Alana dies and Hugh is heartbroken by his loss. The novel’s ontological 
blurrings between fictional beings (Alana) and referential beings (the real author’s wife) result in an 
affective transfer: “for A, and all the days left” is endowed with greater intensity as readers’ 
emotional experiences of the fictional narrative are brought to bear on their mind-model for Lance 
Olsen—which includes his feelings for wife Andi—in the real, discourse-world context and related 
referential interpretation of the dedication. 
 
Meeting Authors 
Complicating ontological boundaries further, there’s no place like time is a catalogue for the 
retrospective of Alana Olsen’s films, with corresponding exhibitions installed in real-world 
galleries.17 Andi Olsen is an artist-filmmaker and created the films exhibited as Alana Olsen’s 
whilst Lance Olsen wrote the catalogue and exhibition text-plates. The catalogue credits Alana 
Olsen on the title page while the next page states “in collaboration with Aila Olsen,” who is 
consequently implied to have written most of the book. The book is organized into the equivalent of 
chapters about each of Alana Olsen’s films, before ending in the purported reprinting of an online 
interview with Alana. 
The first chapter is attributed to Aila who contextualizes the retrospective in relation to her 
mother’s death and father’s disappearance and speaks of her brother Lance’s editing of the 
manuscript he subsequently calls “Theories of Forgetting” (all events and details compatible with 
those presented in Olsen’s novel). Other chapters are attributed to guest contributors whose 
ontological groundings vary (though all were, in fact, written by Lance Olsen). Of these 
contributors, whether readers recognize Lance Olsen will depend on prior knowledge. Similarly, 
readers possessing knowledge about experimental literature might identify real-world equivalents 
for R. M. Berry, Larry McCaffery, Christina Milletti, Davis Schneiderman. The identity of other 
contributors is ambiguous: whether Takumi Saito should be mapped to the real Japanese actor is 
unclear, and who Mike Christensen, Uljana Weber, and Paula Haig are cannot be ascertained 
through Google search, at least not mine during the period of writing this article (2018–20). Finally, 
the identity of some contributors seems mystifying: Chloé Lefebvre is credited with writing the 
chapter on “Self-Portraits” in 2001; I couldn’t identify a real-world persona, though the first result 
in a Google search led to a Wikipedia page about a portrait called ‘Chloé’ by nineteenth century 
painter Jules Joseph Lefebvre. 18  The difficulty in ascertaining the ontological status of these 
contributors shows up the shaky ground of fictionality, when suitable context is missing and readers 
do not have enough information in their mind-model of the author to identify the intended 
grounding. 
I conducted a qualitative empirical questionnaire study, completed by 46 participants, to 
gauge visitors’ assessments of the exhibition’s fictionality when it displayed at the Snite Museum of 
Art at the University of Notre Dame, USA, in 2018 (for more information on this study, its methods 
and results, see: Gibbons, “‘Why’”). Visitor-participants without prior knowledge of the 
exhibition’s fictionality tended to interpret Alana Olsen as a real artist and this felt referentiality led, 
in some cases, to self-reports of heightened emotional involvement. It is nevertheless possible that 
readers of Theories of Forgetting, aware of the ontological hoax, will still find the exhibition 
emotionally impactful. Studies in cognitive neuroscience show that the brain registers differences 
between fictional characters and real people not based on ontological grounding but perceived 
personal relevance associated with knowledge in episodic memory (Abraham; Abraham, von 
Cramon, and Schubotz). This leads to the premise that “it may be possible that under certain 
circumstances a fictional entity of high personal relevance (e.g., a ‘World of Warcraft’ character to 
a chronic gamer) could yield greater activation than a real famous person of low personal 
relevance” (Abraham and von Cramon 6). Moreover, text comprehension studies which employ 
second-person address, and thus involve constructing personally relevant text-worlds, make clashes 
between reality and fiction harder to judge as “implausible” (Yang and Xue, “Reality/Fiction” 174). 
The personal relevance resulting from the exhibition’s discourse-world setting and readers’ past 
cognitive encounters with Alana Olsen could also result in ontological blurs. The exhibition may 
therefore feel real and personally affecting to both prior readers of Theories of Forgetting as well as 




This article has explored literary fictionality and ontology blurrings in Lance Olsen’s Theories of 
Forgetting and its companion texts there’s no place like time and [[there]]. Text World Theory 
explicated the ontological relations between imagined representations or text-worlds and readers’ 
felt reality in the discourse-world. The metalanguage of the narrative interrelation framework 
complemented this approach. It allowed a systematic description of ontological interrelations 
between the different narratives in Theories of Forgetting as well as of enactors, including enactor-
authors. A cognitive approach to fictionality is—my analysis demonstrates and I maintain—
unmatched as a method for tracking ontological distortions and readers’ resultant experiences, 
particularly in relation to the kind of blurred fictionality found in autofiction or arising from 
enactor-author interrelations. 
As multimodal hoax fictions, Lance Olsen’s Theories of Forgetting and there’s no place like 
time, as well as Andi and Lance Olsen’s corresponding exhibition, present readers with ontological 
challenges. Whilst it might be tempting to class these ontological blurrings—in both technique and 
effect—as postmodernist, I have argued that instead they bring the fiction closer to the reader’s 
discourse-world reality and transfer the affective intensities of the fictive narrative onto our lived 
experience of the real, including our emotional affiliations with others (characters we feel to be real 
or our perceptions of real authors). Because all text-worlds are built using the same conceptual 
apparatus, however real characters might seem or to whatever extent authors might become fictive, 
questions of fictionality and ontology are not actual but, rather, cognitive and experiential. There is 
no substitute for lived embodied empirical reality—that is, ‘us’ as participants in the discourse-
world, the ‘here’ and ‘now’, the place that is real—or to quote from Aila’s marginalia “we are 
living in a way they couldn’t because we existed in the first place” (H.153). 
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1 The exhibition catalogue for there’s no place like time is unpaginated. 
2  Indeed, a central tenant of cognitive stylistics and cognitive narratology is that mental representations rely, 
fundamentally, on embodied cognition. For instance, see arguments made by Joanna Gavins in Text World Theory and 
David Herman in Storytelling and the Sciences of the Mind. Emphasis on embodiment is also present in the articles by 
Marco Caracciolo and Merja Polvinen in this special issue. 
3 I have previously made a similar claim, with Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, arguing that what 
Marie-Laure Ryan calls panfictionality, associated with postmodernism, has transitioned to a contemporary, 
metamodern panreality: “ . . . just as postmodernism has been replaced by a new cultural logic, so too has 
panfictionality been superseded. Metamodernist texts instead produce a ‘reality effect’—a performance of, or insistence 
on, reality—and ironically they create this effect by using many of the same postmodernist devices Ryan identifies as 
panfictionalising techniques” (Gibbons, Vermeulen, and van den Akker 174). 
 
4 Text World Theory has specific linguistic conventions: reference to the framework as theory/approach, either in full or 
clipped (e.g., Text World analysis), uses title case; world terms (e.g., ‘text-world’) are presented in sentence case and 
hyphenated. Unless otherwise stated, all key terms from Text World Theory outlined here were proposed by Paul Werth 
or Joanna Gavins. 
5 The appearance of reality has, of course, been subject to philosophical debate for centuries, with similar insights 
advocated by Kant in his conception of “transcendental idealism” (for a summary of Kant’s thinking here, see Stang). 
6 At the 20 Years of Text World Theory: A Celebration symposium (University of Sheffield, September 2019), Joanna 
Gavins facilitated a discussion in which she highlighted the distinction between the storyworld and text-worlds (in the 
form of what I am here calling their micro-level form). The same distinction is also noted by Jeremy Scott (2020). 
7 Monika Fludernik defines experientiality as “the quasi-mimetic evocation of real-life experience” (12). The term, 
though, has been used in various ways: for instance, whilst Fludernik is primarily interested in the representation of 
character experience, Caracciolo considers the “tension between the textual design and the recipient’s experiential 
background” (49). Whilst it differs, my use of the term is more aligned with Caracciolo’s since my focus is on the 
reading experience itself. 
8  For a more detailed review of existing empirical research concerning fiction/reality distinctions, see Gibbons, 
“‘Why.’” 
9 The relationships between narratives of anthropogenic climate change and ontological instability are taken up in 
greater detail by Lieven Ameel, Marco Caracciolo, and Pieter Vermeulen in their articles in this special issue. 
10 In Theories of Forgetting, Alana’s and Hugh’s narratives start at alternate sides of the book and both have their own 
page numbers. Consequently, I use ‘A’ for Alana’s narrative or ‘H’ for Hugh’s in my references. All of Aila’s 
comments are referenced based on the page numbering for Hugh’s narrative due to the temporal ordering/logic of the 
fiction. 
11 Such a layered ontological structure is typical of recursive narratives and a construction often made visible by 
multimodality in literature, as in Mark Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves, Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud & 
Incredibly Close, and J. J. Abrams’ and Doug Dorst’s S (see Gibbons, Multimodality; “Reading S”). 
12 Aila’s marginalia highlights the familial relationship by referencing her addressee as an “intimate sibling” (H.285) 
and as her brother: “dear bro” (H.59; H.153) “mole-brother” (H.76), ‘imaginary brother’ (H.251). 
13 Lejeune’s example is Jean-Paul Sartre’s Les Mots (The Words), where the narrating “me” is said to be the grandson 
of “Doctor Sartre”. Lejeune then argues: “From the name, we grasp the identity of the protagonist, of the narrator, and 
of the author whose name is displayed above the title: Jean-Paul Sartre. And, that it indeed concerns the famous author, 
and not a homonym, is proved by the text itself” (17). 
14 Mason conceives of her categories of interrelation as offering degrees of granularity that exist along a cline (77–78) 
so this seems like a feasible solution. 
15 A comparable dynamic emerges as a result of the presence of the “Ruth” enactor-author in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for 
the Time Being: the novel’s similarly recursive structure “ontologically embeds the ‘Nao’ chapters within the ‘Ruth’ 
chapters; then, through autofictional correspondence, embeds the ‘Ruth’ chapters in—or perhaps superimposes them on 
—the real-world of Ruth Ozeki. Rather than alienate readers from the fictional world, the effect is to make the fictional 
world feel more real” (Gibbons, Vermeulen, and van den Akker 178). 
16  In his article in this special issue, Lieven Ameel offers the concept of the ‘fold’ to account for ontological 
interactions, overlaps, and distortions. Because of its basis in cognitive science and Text World Theory, I use the 
concept of a blended-world to account for readers’ cognitive operations here. Perhaps, however, the fold also 
captures—in literary critical terms—something of the co-existence of these macro-level text-worlds interanimating 
within the storyworld. 
17 The first exhibition was shown at the Green House in Berlin (November 2015). there’s no place like time has since 
shown as full exhibitions: in Germany, at Momentum Worldwide in Berlin (May to June 2017); and in the United 
States, at Texas A&M University (September-October 2014), the New Hampshire Institute of Art Roger Williams 
Gallery in New Hampshire (February to April 2017), Lake Forest College’s Sonnenschein Gallery and Albright Gallery 
in Illinois (April 2017), and the University of Notre Dame’s Snite Museum of Art in Indiana (September to December 
2018). 
18 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chloé_(artwork)  
